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Abstract
The use of digital technologies, social media platforms, and (big) data analytics is reshaping crisis management in the
21st century. In turn, the sharing, collecting, and monitoring of personal and potentially sensitive data during crises has
become a central matter of interest and concern which governments, emergency management and humanitarian profes-
sionals, and researchers are increasingly addressing. This article asks if these rapidly advancing challenges can be governed
in the same ways that data is governed in periods of normalcy. By applying a political realist perspective, we argue that
governing data in crises is challenged by state interests and by the complexity of other actors with interests of their own.
The article focuses on three key issues: 1) vital interests of the data subject vis-à-vis the right to privacy; 2) the possibilities
and limits of an international or global policy on data protection vis-à-vis the interests of states; and 3) the complexity
of actors involved in the protection of data. In doing so, we highlight a number of recent cases in which the problems of
governing data in crises have become visible.
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1. Introduction
The significance of digital technologies and data in cri-
sis management is surging. Emergency and humanitar-
ian organizations increasingly rely on information and
communication technologies (ICTs), mobile data, social
media platforms, geospatial information, and (big) data
analytics to assess risks, provide early warnings, conduct
relief efforts, and distribute aid (International Federation
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2013; Palen
& Anderson, 2016; UN Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs [UNOCHA], 2012). These devel-
opments have also brought a range of new actors
to the scene of crisis management, including private
companies, academic institutions, and global online
volunteer networks (Meier, 2015) who engage in cri-
sis management processes by providing and/or pro-
cessing data. Recent examples include private-sector
partnerships (e.g., Flowminder and the International
Organization for Migration [IOM], Parity Ethereum and
the World Food Programme [WFP], Facebook and
various humanitarian agencies; Meier, 2017), crowd-
sourcing initiatives (e.g., Humanitarian OpenStreetMap,
CrisisMappers; Yates & Paquette, 2011), and even the
unprompted efforts of researchers (Clark, 2019). It also
includes cases of local citizens using social media plat-
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forms to organize bottom-up response efforts (Reuter &
Kaufhold, 2018), which can disrupt traditional emergen-
cy and crisis response mechanisms (Albris, 2018).
While these developments undoubtedly work to pro-
vide specific benefits within the sector that would not
otherwise be possible, they are also creating new data-
related challenges. This pertains not least to concerns
around data protection and privacy. The General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) in EU law and other regula-
tory frameworks havemade data governance a key politi-
cal issue, alongside emerging concerns over surveillance
capitalism (Zuboff, 2019), the discriminatory politics of
big data (O’Neil, 2016), and the power of Big Tech in shap-
ing politics and society (Morozov, 2014). These concerns
now translate into various potential risks associated with
the use of personal data in crises, including relationships
of trust between citizens and governments (Watson &
Rodrigues, 2018, p. 92), as well as data being made
available to third parties for whom it was not intended
(McDonald, 2019). The use of personal behavioural data
such as communications, location, and even health and
demographic information can be useful in crises but is
also highly sensitive and revealing. Indeed, the Covid-19
pandemic, which is ongoing at the time of writing this
article, is emblematic of many of these concerns, as gov-
ernments and companies are now attempting to track
and contain the virus via apps and themobile data of indi-
viduals (Kirchgaessner, 2020; Marrow & Soldatkin, 2020).
Concerns over data protection are also providing
uncharted and complex dynamics for humanitarian orga-
nizations, emergencymanagers, and other actors to navi-
gate. When mishandled, these entities may compromise
their organization’s integrity and relationships with tra-
ditional stakeholders such as donors, governments, and
beneficiaries. Such was recently the case in Yemen, after
the WFP pressed the Houthi Government to implement-
ing a biometric identification system, as a precondition
for receiving aid. Although the WFP’s aim of using the
biometrical system was allegedly to ensure fairness and
transparency in the food and aid distribution, the utiliza-
tion of such new data-driven technologies was not well
received. As a result, the Yemeni Government opted for
the “partial stoppage of aid, accusing theWFP of being a
surveillance operation” (McDonald, 2019, p. 1).
To be certain, the concerns around data governance
in crises are now many and have become a growing
point of discussion around which governments, humani-
tarian organizations, academics, and individuals are con-
tributing. While data governance issues in the context of
humanitarian crises are not substantially different from
general concerns over the application of data for the
public good, in which there are necessary trade-offs,
they do tend to be more complex for two reasons. First,
urgent concerns over the protection of life and proper-
ty permeating crises often render questions of data pro-
tection and privacy secondary. Second, the complexity
of institutions crosscutting transnational relations and
international agreements in the world of humanitarian
work puts the question of national sovereignty to the
test, in ways that differ from other domains of policy
and governance.
In this article, we identify two dominant strands of
literature on data governance in crises. The first consists
of handbooks, guidelines, and very concrete attempts to
apply principles of data protection to crisis management.
The other is a highly critical literature, couched in aca-
demic discourse, attempting to mobilize a language that
can make visible the power structures inherent in data
governance in crises.While the inputs fromboth of these
strands are important to further our understanding of
the role of data protection in crisis management, in this
article we propose to look at the issue from a perspective
of political realism.
From this point of departure, we ask if the rapidly
advancing problems of data protection during crises can
be regulated in ways following logically from the ways
that data is regulated in periods of normalcy and non-
urgency. By applying a political realist lens, we argue that
data governance in crises is shaped by state interests
and by the existence of a wide range of actors that hold
competing interests. We do this by homing in on three
key issues. First, the balancing of the protection of vital
interests of the data subject vis-à-vis the right to privacy.
Second, the possibilities and limits of an international or
global policy on data protection in disaster management
vis-à-vis the interests of states. Third, the complexity of
actors involved in the governance and protection of data
in times of crisis.
The article is structured in the following manner:
In the next section, we provide a brief overview of the
different themes emerging across disciplines and gov-
ernance domains with respect to data governance in
crises. In Section 3, we present our argument by way
of examining the three-abovementioned issues.We then
discuss how these three issues intersect, before offering
our conclusions.
2. Data in Crises
Crises generally refer to high-impact events, which cause
serious societal disruption. In this article, ‘crises’ is used
as a broad overarching term to include emergencies and
incidents, disasters originating from natural and man-
made hazards, as well as other humanitarian scenarios
such as those concerning pandemics and refugees. These
scenarios may be short-term or ongoing, and will involve
different actors depending on the context, phase, and
needs of the crisis.
Within this broad framing, themechanisms andways
by which ICTs, web-based platforms, and data are now
involved in crisis management are many. In this regard,
legal and ethical issues concerning data governance may
also vary depending on, among other things, the context
of a crisis, and on the types of data (e.g., personal or
aggregate), and how they are generated, collected, and
used. For instance, different rules and ethical considera-
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tions may apply to actively and passively produced data
relating to crowdsourcing initiatives in crises. The first
category represents data that are actively generated and
submitted by users through a mobile app or other ser-
vice. In contrast, the second may involve the harvest-
ing of public data from social networks and repositories,
where end users may not by “directly involved in the pro-
cess and possibly not even aware of the data collection
in progress” (Dell’Acqua & De Vecchi, 2017, p. 1916).
While a growing corpus of research on the appli-
cability of mobile phone data, social media platforms,
microblogging, and geospatial information in crises has
been published in recent years, there is a shortage of
studies looking at data governance and data ethics in
these contexts. In this section, we highlight the existing
literature addressing questions in this domain. From the
existing literature, we can deduce two distinct strands
that each have their own objectives and genres. On the
one hand, there is a body of documents that focus
on crafting actionable guidelines and handbooks that
address how humanitarian organizations and emergen-
cy response agencies should use data for crisis manage-
ment. On the other, there is a body of research litera-
ture vested in and drawing from academic fields such as
critical data studies and surveillance studies that seeks
to point out the power relations and unintended conse-
quences of the use of data in crises. In the following three
subsections, we first present both strands of literature,
and thereafter present a critical but constructive critique
of the literature by proposing a third approach, namely
a political realist lens.
2.1. Frameworks, Handbooks, and Guidelines
The 2010 Haitian earthquake triggered a new era for
crisis management in which the uses and challenges
around data and ICTs really emerged in the sector (Yates
& Paquette, 2011). The application of drones, remote
sensing data, and crowdsourcing initiatives via social
media and text messages following the event became
the focus of numerous reports and spurred innovative
dynamics within the sector. A decade later, those devel-
opments have fed into a rapidly advancing digitalization
of the crisis management sector, where the possibilities
of using technologies such as AI and machine learning
for big data analytics are now a reality. These advances
hold much potential, but they have also resulted in a
need to address issues of data governance and ethics
in the humanitarian space, particularly from a gover-
nance perspective.
As a result, numerous frameworks, reports, guide-
lines, codes of conduct, and other documents are now
being generated within the humanitarian sector address-
ing data protection and ethics. Many have emerged
from international organizations and NGOs that have
mandates or stakes in the management of internation-
al and national crises. There is thus a path dependen-
cy at work pertaining to organizational outlooks and
priorities. McClure (2019) notes that many of these
resources “broadly seek to provide some form of prac-
tical guidance for either a specific organization or sub-
sector activity of humanitarian action, such as biomet-
rics or mobile surveys” (p. 2). As one of the first inter-
national organizations to develop its own internal data
protection policy and manual, the IOM provides a good
example of data protection principles based on orga-
nizational priorities (i.e., protecting the right to priva-
cy, human dignity, and well-being of migrants; IOM,
2010). Some attempts are also being made to provide
more holistic frameworks, such as The Standby Task
Force Code of Conduct (Standby Task Force, n.d.), the
Signal Code (Greenwood, Howarth, Poole, Raymond, &
Scarnecchia, 2017), the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) Data Protection Handbook (Kuner &
Marelli, 2017), and the more recent working draft of the
OCHA Data Responsibility Guidelines (UNOCHA, 2019)
from the UN’s Centre for Humanitarian Data.
These functional (i.e., practical) documents have
largely emerged to build on top of existing legal,
human rights, and ethical resources and standards.
Indeed, humanitarian data ethics cuts across multi-
ple fields including (but not limited to) internation-
al law (e.g., international humanitarian law, refugee
law, human rights law), international and domestic
technical and legal standards for data protection, and
ethics in areas ranging from big data and computer
and information ethics to medical principles such as
Do No Harm (McClure, 2019). Data protection issues
have existed long before social media and big data
saw the light of day, hence the starting positions for
many of these documents is that “data protection and
humanitarian action should be seen as compatible,
complementary to, and supporting each other” (ICRC,
2017, p. 15). In this regard, some of the most impor-
tant international instruments include the UN General
Assembly Resolution 45/95 of 14 December 1990 adopt-
ing the Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized
Personal Data Files (UN General Assembly, 1990), the
International Standards on the Protection of Personal
Data and Privacy (TheMadrid Resolution) adopted by the
International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy
Commissioners (ICDPPC) in Madrid in 2009 (ICDPPC,
2009), the OECD Privacy Framework (OECD, 2013), and
the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection
of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing
of Personal Data (Convention for the Protection of
Individuals, 1981), including the Additional Protocol
(Additional Protocol to the Convention, 2001; see ICRC,
2017; Kuner & Marelli, 2017, pp. 15–16).
2.2. Critical Studies of Data in Crises
Researchers coming from disaster studies (Alexander,
2014), as well as from mixed-methods fields such
as crisis informatics (Palen & Anderson, 2016; Reuter
& Kaufhold, 2018) and social data science (Albris,
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2018), have approached questions about data in crises
from pragmatic and adaptable perspectives (Nagendra,
Narayanamurthy, & Moser, 2020; Watson & Rodrigues,
2018). The effective incorporation and wielding of ‘big
data’ formats, for example, is widely seen by scholars as
the most pressing frontier for crisis management. Data
in crises is not collected for the sake of collection itself,
but to make it actionable, with the aim of having some
form of utility for the response or recovery activities dur-
ing emergencies (Boersma, Wagenaar, & Wolbers, 2012;
Wolbers & Boersma, 2013).
However, a more prominent research agenda has
emerged which is concerned with the inherent chal-
lenges and risks, which accompany the rampant growth
of data and information during crises. These works large-
ly stem from critically oriented concepts in disciplines
such as media and communication studies on critical
infrastructure (Parks & Starosielski, 2015), research in
critical data studies (boyd & Crawford, 2012; Dalton &
Thatcher, 2014) and critical geography (Burns, 2015b;
Turk, 2017) and work in science and technology stud-
ies and surveillance studies (Boersma & Fonio, 2018).
All of these, to a certain extent, share an underlying
assumption that “there is no such thing as raw data, and
that our technologies are always shaped by, and serve,
some interests over others” (Soden & Palen, 2018, p. 4;
see also Gitelman, 2013). Each of these disciplines have
amassed a rich canon of work concerned with how the
lack of accountability to local stakeholders and inequali-
ties in the access to technical infrastructures and data in
crises are merely extensions of larger political and mate-
rial interests in these processes.
Along similar lines, recent discussions have focused
on linkages between digital humanitarian networks and
what has been termed philanthropic capitalism, which
sees the involvement of private-sector actors in the cri-
sis sector (Burns, 2015a; Klein, 2007). The highly techni-
cal nature of modern-day crisis management has result-
ed in a complexity of new actors arriving into the sector
such as Big Tech corporations (i.e., Facebook andGoogle).
These actors hold interests which are sometimes seen to
clash with traditional humanitarian principles. Research
in this area has focused on the marketing of ideas by
these actors that technical expertise and “for-profit moti-
vations lead to larger volumes of high-quality data and
reliable data curation in crisis contexts” (Burns, 2015a,
p. 62). Not only do these developments have the poten-
tial to undercut humanitarian principles during crises,
but theymay also jeopardize the rights, privacy, and secu-
rity of affected populations. From this viewpoint, tech-
nology and data are indirectly becoming ‘agents of chaos’
in crises, rather than assets for reducing risks.
2.3. A Realist Lens
In this section, we will discuss some of the arguments
made by researchers related to the two abovementioned
strands of literature by way of outlining what we here
term a political realist lens, which serves as a third posi-
tion. In doing so, our aim is to lay the foundation for the
subsequent sections of the article, in which we analyze
three key issues around data governance in crises.
The first aforementioned strand of literature, we
believe, is to some extent not addressing the deeper and
most important questions, namely whether data protec-
tion in crises can (or should) be governed through global
and universal policy frameworks. Let us illustrate through
a recent example from the existing literature. In an edito-
rial for the journal International Data Privacy Law, Kuner,
Svantesson, Cate, Lynskey, and Millard (2017) discuss a
range of issues pertaining to data protection and human-
itarian emergencies, based on the publication of the
Handbook on Data Protection in Humanitarian Action.
Humanitarian organizations face a dual challenge: They
have to rely on personal data for expedient and efficient
humanitarian response, while at the same time having
to protect vulnerable people’s data. As Kuner et al. (2017,
p. 147) note, “In the context of humanitarian action, data
protection can literally be a matter of life and death.”
While they seem to recognize the inherent tensions we
outline here, they also state: “While there may be occa-
sional instances of friction between the two areas, data
protection and humanitarian action in emergency situa-
tions should be viewed as complementary rather than
contradictory” Kuner et al. (2017, p. 148). In many con-
crete instances, this might indeed be the case, and we
should indeed hope that it is. Yet although Kuner et al.
are correct in pointing out that, for instance, the GDPR
does allow for flexible interpretation of the lawful basis
upon which data is processed with reference to vital
interests, there are deeper questions with respect to this
issue that remain unaddressed, which we will return to.
In contrast, the second body of literature seems to
be addressing questions that are of great importance,
but in a manner that is not providing relevant critiques.
While much of this literature is indeed looking at some
of the problems and violations of potential breaches
of data protection principles and laws, there is lack of
recognition in this literature of the real politik at work,
and too much focus on social constructions of identi-
ties, categories, and the imaginaries of progress and con-
trol invoked by a reliance on data for crisis management.
Such a focus indeed mirrors much of the general litera-
ture in critical data studies (e.g., boyd & Crawford, 2012).
That is, that data is always imbricated in power relations,
and is part and parcel of state practices in surveilling
its population.
In seeking to carve out a space for a third position, we
employ a political realist lens to the question of whether
and how personal data can and/or should be governed
in crises. This is not meant to be in opposition to the
two strands of literature outlined above, but rather to
complement them. The political realist approach rests on
the notion that states have legitimate interests or rea-
sons of state—raison d’états—which guide and under-
gird their actions and priorities (Morgenthau, 1978). One
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such reason in the era of late modernity and in our high-
ly advanced information societies is to collect data about
the state’s population, and to apply it to useful ends in
public governance. This reliance on data is of course part
of a larger history and development about the rise of the
welfare state and the surveillance society in tandemwith
a trust in numbers and expertise (Porter, 1996) and the
biopolitical interests of states (Foucault, 1990).
While political realism is central to the study of
politics and international relations, it is by no means,
as Wohlforth (2008) argues, one coherent theory. It is
rather a family of ideas and lenses through which polit-
ical and power relations are viewed. Furthermore, we
do not wholesale buy into political realism as a theoret-
ical dogma. Nor do we disregard the role of non-state
and international actors (see Section 3.3). We recognize
the complexity of humanitarian governance, as a field of
multiple competing national, regional, and international
interests (Barnett, 2013). We do however argue that dis-
cussions around data governance need to bemore realis-
tic. By this we mean that state interests inevitably shape
the implementation and development of different politi-
cal andpolicy arrangements regarding data laws anddata
ethical codes. Such interests seek to preserve the narrow
self-interests of states and governments for the sake of
the groups they purport to represent. Moreover, given
the lack of a clear governing authority in the world of
international data governance, different instantiations of
politics of power, often referenced to securitization and
the vital interests of the population, will inevitably ensue.
The following sections of the article will discuss the poli-
tics of data governance in crises from this vantage point.
3. Issues in the Governance of Crisis Data
In the following subsections, we will outline three dif-
ferent arguments for why we believe that data gov-
ernance in crises cannot be modelled on the notions
underlying data governance and data ethics in periods of
normality. These are vital interests, state interests, and
actor complexity.
3.1. Vital Interests
The concept of vital interests is precisely the conundrum
which lies at the heart of our concern, since personal
data protection collides with crisis management priori-
ties: States have a presumable preference for saving lives
or minimizing economic costs over protecting personal
data principles. The mechanisms of vital and public inter-
ests, as for instance stipulated in the GDPR, ensure that
possibility for states and other entities acting as data con-
trollers in crises.
The term ‘vital interests’ in relation to data protec-
tion is used in legal and policy contexts to refer to situa-
tions in which there is a legitimate purpose to collect per-
sonal data due tomatters of life and death. Vital interests
are, on the one hand, inserted into the GDPR to enable
the collection and processing of data in health emergen-
cies in case a patient is unable to give his or her informed
consent due to illness or unconsciousness; on the oth-
er hand, as recital 46 of the GDPR makes explicit, vital
interests also refer to large-scale emergency scenarios,
such as epidemics or disasters. As one of the six legal
bases uponwhich personal data can be collected and pro-
cessed, vital interests have however been seen as a last
way out in case no other legal basis can be used. As recital
46 states:
Processing of personal data based on the vital inter-
est of another natural person should in principle take
place only where the processing cannot bemanifestly
based on another legal basis. Some types of process-
ing may serve both important grounds of public inter-
est and the vital interests of the data subject as for
instance when processing is necessary for humanitar-
ian purposes, including for monitoring epidemics and
their spread or in situations of humanitarian emer-
gencies, in particular in situations of natural and man-
made disasters. (European Parliament & Council of
European Union, 2016)
Yet while the legal basis of vital interests provides a legit-
imate reason to collect and process personal data under
extraordinary circumstances, it is not specified precise-
ly what the baselines for vital interests are, nor when
the circumstances are special enough to warrant talk
of vital interests. The problem with mechanisms such
as vital or public interests is that they are flexible for
interpretation. Thus, states or other actors might invoke
the need to collect and process data about data sub-
jects by reference to vital or public interests regardless
of whether the data could be collected via other means
(e.g., informed consent).
While the GDPR is but one legal framework, and so
does not influence all of the cases of data governance in
crises, it does reflect general ideas about what is at stake
in how states and other actors are able to collect and pro-
cess data in crises. Other legal bases for collecting and
processing data—such as informed consent or the per-
formance of a contract—might not be as effective in sit-
uations of great urgency, where lives and livelihoods are
at stake.
Parallel to the notion of vital interest, we also find the
principle of public interest in frameworks such as GDPR.
While vital interest designates the interest of the data
subject or the legal person(s) in question, public interest
might refer to multiple things, including the interest of
society in general, or the public sector or the state itself.
From a realist perspective, states and other actors will
seek to maximize their power and influence in any given
situation, including in crises. The governance of an emer-
gency or crisis will to a large extent rest on the ability
of the state or other actors to have both quantitative-
ly (a large amount of data) and qualitatively (the right
kind of data) about the human groups who are the target
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of governance measures. This can, in turn, be framed as
data being processed and collected without the consent
of data subjects, because it serves some public interest.
3.2. State Interests
The second issue follows directly from the first, namely
that states, from a political realist perspective, have clear
and often legitimate interests in collecting and process-
ing data about subjects because this will likely increase
the successful management and control of the crisis.
We cannot presume that states would follow the same
kind of rules regarding data protection in crises to the
same degree that they would regarding data protection
writ large, which in itself is lacking widespread standard-
ization. Expecting a global ratification of the same prin-
ciples and guidelines is laudable, but highly unrealistic.
This is central, because data in emergencies and crises
are matters of national or regional security. States have
thus extraordinary interests in protecting and govern-
ing data. From a political realist perspective, states will
always see the necessity of controlling a possible ormate-
rialized state of emergency over citizens’ rights to data
protection and privacy. Many states already have such
mechanisms in place in their information and data man-
agement laws, and again the vital interest or public inter-
est articles in the GDPR encompass that possibility for
states to derogate from the rights of data subjects in
extraordinary times.
These measures by the state can also be viewed
through a broader legal lens, specifically concerning
international human rights law and disaster risk reduc-
tion. It is widely accepted that the political obliga-
tions contained in many disaster risk reduction instru-
ments, such as the Sendai Framework and International
Law Commission Draft Articles on the Protection of
Persons in the Event of Disasters, are underlined by
the legal obligations imposed on states by human rights
instruments (Sommario & Venier, 2018). Indeed, under
international law, states may have positive obligations
to guarantee fundamental human rights of individu-
als and groups affected by crises under their jurisdic-
tion. This includes, among other rights, rights relat-
ed to life, physical security, integrity, and dignity, as
well as the right to privacy in a digital context (UN
General Assembly, 1966a; UN Human Rights Committee,
1988). And yet, as Sommario (2012) points out, it is
also “widely accepted that when facing serious public
emergencies states can temporarily suspend their obli-
gations under certain human rights treaties and adopt
exceptional measures aimed at overcoming the crisis”
(UN General Assembly, 2016, p. 43; Sommario, 2012).
For instance, the European Convention of Human Rights,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights are instruments which allow for dero-
gations as lawful responses to emergencies (Council of
Europe, 1950; UN General Assembly, 1966a; UN General
Assembly, 1966b). Article 15 of the European Convention
of Human Rights (Council of Europe, 1950) states:
In time of war or other public emergency threatening
the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may
take measures derogating from its obligations under
[the] Convention to the extent strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation, provided that such mea-
sures are not inconsistent with its other obligations
under international law.
To place this within the context of this article: In a state
of emergency, states may derogate from international
law and fundamental human rights related to data pro-
tections of individuals for the sake of national interests.
In fact, in some circumstances statesmay need to impose
limitations to certain human rights, such as those deal-
ing with privacy, in order to uphold others (i.e., right to
health), especially those which are non-derogable (i.e.,
the right to life).
Of course, there are also certain conditions that
must be met in order for states to legitimately dero-
gate from human rights, which in time of crisis should
be assessed via the balancing of interests and rights
through the legitimate limitation clauses found in many
provisions (e.g., privacy vs. public interest, or two indi-
viduals’ competing rights). In this regard, the considera-
tions to be made are not so dissimilar from those previ-
ously discussed in the section on vital and public inter-
ests and GDPR. These discussions also bring up more
delicate political questions, as to the extent to which
human rights law (or international law in general) should
interfere with the prioritization of states’ resources and
approaches to safeguarding the life of the nation in
crisis (Lauta, 2016). While these questions are outside
the scope of this article, they are in line with realist
thinking harking back to Schmitt’s (2005) notion of the
sovereign’s power vested in the ability to determine the
state of emergency.
3.3. Actor Complexity
The third issue is that, in crises, there is a great com-
plexity of actors with different mandates, interests, and
competencies. This is particularly evident in the technical
space of crises, where it is often necessary to merge the
expertise and resources from various entities, which can
clash along epistemological, strategic, and institutional
lines (Albris, Lauta, & Raju, 2020). While states—per the
two previous issues—may be the primary actors when it
comes to data governance, non-state actors are impor-
tant. Acknowledging this does not inhibit the political
realist lens we base our argument on. Rather, the fact
that non-state actors do have a role to play in shaping
ongoing debates and frameworks for data governance
is an empirical and realist fact. Increasingly, we do see
humanitarian organizations, research institutions, and
private companies putting forth recommendations and
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guidelines that call for global data governance standards
that (intentionally or not) align with their own specific
needs and/or interests in crises. Others seem to take the
opposite approach, acknowledging that their guidelines
are domain specific and not intended to contribute to
a broader set of standards, while simultaneously build-
ing from and/or referencing established norms. In both
instances, by referencing international humanitarian law,
human rights law, GDPR, and other international techni-
cal and legal standards for data protection, actors legit-
imize their own additions and subsequently their inter-
ests and perceived beliefs about the standards needed
across the crisis management sector.
This is a rational strategy to pursue. Just as crises are
complex and context specific, so too must be the man-
dates and interests of different actors. IOM, for instance,
may be more concerned with the monitoring of location-
al data than the World Health Organization, which sees
the protection of information related to personal health
indicators as a greater priority. Similarly, humanitarian
organizations will certainly have more applied, timely
concerns than those of critical scientific researchers who
conceptualize potential risks based on their observa-
tions of diverse variables across a broader landscape. In
addition, private and technical actors must strike a bal-
ance between revenue models and business objectives
on the one hand, and responsible data collection, use,
and management on the other. At the end of the day,
data governance will inevitably reflect the deep-seated
goals of those calling for and implementing it—in what-
ever format.
This, of course, also assumes that different actors
actually know what effective data protection and gov-
ernance should look like (Parker, 2018). In reality, the
complexity and ambiguity among the growing number of
rules and policies for data management has left nearly
every sector struggling to keep up in order to be legal-
ly compliant (or at least appear to be) to instill trust in
their target audiences and of course to avoid liability
issues down the road (e.g., the ongoing implementation
of GDPR). We believe these developments may result in
at least three negative trends in the crisis management
sector: 1) the implementation of overly restrictive blan-
ket policies to “cover all bases” in the absence of knowl-
edge on appropriate measures; 2) the implementation
of policies which mimic the practices of others but are
not context specific enough or applied in a way to pro-
vide robust, targeted data protection measures for busi-
ness/organizations or individuals whose data is meant to
be protected (Van der Merwe, 2020); and 3) the loose
coupling of humanitarian-related initiatives to the exist-
ing data policies of organizations.
This has been a particularly interesting dynamic
to watch unfold with regards to the relationships of
private corporate actors with states and the broader
humanitarian sector. Private entities have emerged as
crucial actors in crisis management (particularly in the
response phase) owing to their efficiency in technolog-
ical developments and uses, and their access to vast
amounts of data. However, this has also meant that
these actors are increasingly being pressured to bal-
ance their own corporate interests with the interests of
the public as well as with general humanitarian princi-
ples. Companies must gain public trust while simultane-
ously achieving objectives which may be linked direct-
ly or indirectly to other private interests unrelated to
humanitarian causes. The Global Systems for Mobile
Communications (GSMA), for instance, is an industry
organization representing over 750 mobile operators
and hundreds of companies worldwide. They link their
Mobile for Humanitarian Innovation programme and Big
Data for Social Good initiative, to the organizational prin-
ciples on data privacy and security, as well as the more
recent Digital Declaration (GSMA, 2020a, 2020b). Indeed,
the Declaration provides companies within the industry
with a symbolic badge of commitment to upholding digi-
tal principles in terms of handling personal data.
Of course, evolving power dynamics which take place
between private actors and statesmay also influence the
development of rules and measures around data protec-
tion over time. There is considerable research devoted
to the incursion of private tech actors in humanitarian
and state affairs (Saetnan, Schneider, & Green, 2018),
and this has certainly been accelerated during Covid-19
via the use of track-and-trace apps (Scott, Braun, Delcker,
& Manancourt, 2020). In this regard, humanitarian data
governance also reflects larger discussions taking place
around data governance in general, where states and
supranational actors are seen to be increasingly disem-
powered through the corporate empowerment of Big
Tech companies.
Finally, there is another category of actors whose
interests in crises are often overlooked. We are refer-
ring to the data subjects themselves. In the wake of the
Cambridge Analytica data scandal and the growing mon-
etization of personal data, individuals are increasingly
using online social media platforms andmedia outlets to
express their concerns over personal data privacy and to
advocate formore transparent data protection processes
(Arcila, 2020). Similar discussions are emerging around
data protection in crisis management, specifically with-
in societies with greater digital and online connectivity.
Those opposed to surveillance powers and the unautho-
rized use of personal data in crises fear the potential mis-
use (and abuse) of data by governments, private industry,
and other actors. In this paradigm, the concept of vital
interestsmay be interpreted as an invasive, backdoor pol-
icy allowing different actors to access and use personal
data at their own discretion.
4. Discussion
What emerges from the arguments made in the pre-
vious sections is that there are two core issues at
stake: interests and governance. These two components
are fundamental for creating effective data protection
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in crises. However, we believe that as the crisis man-
agement sector has become more technically complex,
these core issues are being increasingly diverted towards
the domain and discipline-specific objectives of different
actors. Whether highlighting the practices, promises, or
perils of data use and governance in crisis management
processes, practitioners and academics are generating
volumes of context-specific guidelines and hypotheses.
At the same time, many of these actors are calling for
standardizations for data protection within the sector.
The flexibility of data governance approaches among
different actors is understandable. However, it also
means that the alignment of standards or governance
approaches in any universal sense seems highly unreal-
istic. In fact, in the absence of common, targeted objec-
tives among actors, the growing number of interests will
work to soften their influence and impact as a whole.
Furthermore, without some form of coercive, normative,
and/or mimetic international pressures, states and oth-
er actors will simply defer to their preferred approach-
es and practices for the treatment of data in crises.
And when viewed through the realist lens, even those
pressures may have very minimal influence on state
behaviors. This is important—especially if we accept the
notion that for better or worse it is the state which is
ultimately responsible for the vital interests of the pub-
lic and individuals. In this paradigm, the attempts to
establish and/or align humanitarian principles, organi-
zational mandates and interests, and data governance
by different actors may actually cause more harm than
good. Because it is quantitatively distracting, yes, but
also because in the search for exclusive or universal solu-
tions, the vital interests of states, and subsequently indi-
viduals, are overlooked.
The question of vital interests is again central,
because it points to the state’s responsibility and authori-
ty to protect the interests of its citizens in crises. At times
it seems this authority is acknowledged and simultane-
ously disregarded by humanitarian professionals when
they create frameworks and guidelines (e.g., Kuner &
Marelli, 2017, p. 58). From a realist perspective, state
interests, including data about its population, are the
main driver for the allocation of values in society and the
positioning of actors. Thus, in order to align effective data
governance and interests, actors should think outside of
their own domains, principles, and standards, and work
directly with policy makers. That is, if data protection in
crises is to be more than just about good intentions.
Of course, whether or not the state possesses the
absolute authority to respond and manage data in crises
does not exclude skepticism around the state’s ability to
do so in an appropriate manner. Never has this been
more apparent than with Covid-19. At the time of writ-
ing this article, governments around the globe are strug-
gling to manage the outbreak while large swaths of the
global population are under some form of mandatory
isolation measures. In order to track the spread of the
virus, various technical initiatives have been launched
by governments and private companies, which rely on
the collection and use of personal data—with or without
the consent of the targeted communities (Google, 2020;
Government of Singapore, 2020). From the perspective
of the state, this has meant attempts to allow for limita-
tions to privacy rights in order to protect individual and
public rights to health, namely inways that can adequate-
ly account for what would otherwise be infringements of
the right to privacywithout needing to resort to themore
drastic measure of derogations. However, the influence
of Big Tech actors in these processes has been substantial
and has not gone unnoticed (Scott et al., 2020). Indeed,
these developments have spurred various media reports
and online protests over the nonconsensual use of per-
sonal data by states in an effort to track and contain the
spread of the virus. A signal to both the increasing utility
of personal data in crises and a growing unease around
its use by many. For now, the extent to which the opin-
ions of companies or of the everyday citizens will affect
data governance is difficult to say, but collectively these
voices could have a normative influence on policy deci-
sions over time.
Where does this leave us? If the efforts around data
protection by actors in the humanitarian space are some-
what ancillary (even problematic) to those of states, then
how do crisis management professionals ensure that
the people’s rights to anonymity, privacy, and security
are guaranteed in situations where both authorities and
people themselves might be more eager to share data
for the potential benefit of others? Here they may face
both technical and legal obstacles regarding data man-
agement, for instance when and if international legal
frameworks and national legislations are in conflict with
one another. Moreover, as McClure (2019) rightly asks,
how should the ethical obligations of emergency and
humanitarian professionals be protected and delineat-
ed from the interests of other actors when engaging in
data-related partnerships and services? We would argue
that the core aspect of the issue does not revolve around
the question of whether data protection and humani-
tarian action are either complementary or contradicto-
ry. Rather, the issue pertains to the fact that actors do
have competing and sometimes overlapping interests at
the interface between data protection and humanitari-
an action, which they should have an interest in aligning
for the greater benefit of the many. This entails working
together in a pragmatic manner as events unfold, rather
than conforming to arbitrary, ill-suited, or organization-
specific rules and standards.
5. Conclusion
To what extent is the question of data protection dif-
ferent in a humanitarian context from other situations
and domains? In this article, we have argued that per-
sonal data cannot be governed in the traditional sense
for three main reasons: vital interests, the interests of
states, and the complexity of actors. Gathering and pro-
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cessing personal data about people might be necessary
to respond to or mitigate harmful events. But given the
urgency underlying crises, ethical principles and even
laws might be bypassed or disregarded, which puts data
subjects in harm’s way in a different sense. This presents
an obvious conundrum:We should do asmuch as we can
to minimize harm to people in disasters, but that might
sometimesmean ethically or legally limiting (or violating)
the rights of data subjects.
By employing a political realist approach as we have
done in this article, we do not intend to dismiss the rele-
vance and utility of international handbooks and guide-
lines on data protection in crises, nor what we have
termed as critical studies in data governance. Rather,
we hope to provide a constructive provocation to the
existing literature and to the growing literature in both
domains. We do so because we believe that current dis-
cussions do not address some of the fundamental issues
at stake, which could hinder a wider adoption of both
legal codes and ethical principles. Thus, our aim is ulti-
mately also one of ensuring that both personal data is
notmissed or violated, while alsomaking sure that crises
are managed and prevented in the best way possible.
While it is certainly true that data is vital to the gover-
nance of crises, the increasing reliance on large data-sets
raises the persistent and pernicious issue that data pro-
tection, as both a legal obligation and ethical principle,
will be forfeited when weighed up against the survival
of those in risk of dangerous events, or the state’s inter-
ests in suffering losses as a result of the risks incurred
in crises.
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